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Abstract
The emergence of labor division in multi-agent system is analyzed by the
method of statistical physics. Considering a system consists of N homogeneous
agents. Their behaviors are determined by the returns from their production. Us-
ing the Metropolis method in statistical physics, which in this model can been
regarded as a kind of uncertainty in decision making, we constructed a Master
equation model to describe the evolution of the agents distribution. When we
introduce the mechanism of learning by doing to describe the effect of technical
progress and a formula for the competitive cooperation, the model gives us the
following interesting results: (1) As the results of long term evolution, the system
can reach a steady state. (2) When the parameters exceed a critical point, the
labor division emerges as the result of phase transition. (3) Although the techni-
cal progress decides whether or not phase transition occurs, the critical point is
strongly effected by the competitive cooperation. From the above physical model
and the corresponding results, we can get a more deeply understanding about the
labor division.
Key Words: Division of Labor, Statistical Physics, Phase Transition, Metropolis
Method
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1 Introduction
The economic system is no doubt a many-particle system-it can be viewed as a collection
of numerous interaction agents. So it is possible that methods and concepts developed
in the study of strongly fluctuation systems might yield new results in this area. In
fact, in the past decades the approaches from statistical physics have been applied
in economics and a lot of interesting results, including empirical laws and theoretical
∗Electrical address: wujinshan@yahoo.com
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models, have been achieved (see [1, 2, 3, 4] and [5] as a review of Econophysics). Among
all these studies, a great deal of researchers is on the agent-based modelling and related
non-trivial self-organizing phenomena. In the economic system, the agents learn from
each other, and their activities may be influenced by others’ actions. These interactions
between agents may be simple and local, but they may have important consequence
related with the emergence of global structure. To understand the mechanism behind
these innovation phenomena, the methods and concepts in phase transitions and critical
phenomena are helpful. For instance, in the study of majority and minority game[6, 7,
8], opinion formation[9], and computational ecosystems[10].
In this paper, we focus on the formation of labor division. Roughly speaking, an
economic organizational pattern is said to involve the division of labor if it allocates
the labor of different individuals to different activities. Hence the specialization of in-
dividuals and the number of professional activities are two sides of division of labor[11].
It is a common functional organization observed in many complex systems, and it is a
fundamental way to improve efficiency and utilization so as to get global optimization
for the system. In order to investigate the mechanism behind the formation of labor
division, we have constructed a simple model with many interacting agents. Every
agent has only two kind of tasks, namely A and B. we describe the level of special-
ization of agent by his working-time share spent on producing A or B. Each agent
make their decisions for working-time in different tasks, and receive payoffs according
to their and other agents’ choices. The agents can adapt by evaluating the performance
of their strategies from past experience so as to get maximum returns. The returns for
any agent is determined by its production with endogenous technical progress-through
the mechanism of learning by doing, and its cooperation with other agents. Just like
the Hamiltonian in statistical physics, the payoff function determines the behavior of
the agent in economic system. Because of the bounded rationality and incompleteness
information in the system, we have introduced a parameter, named social temperature
T (in the model, we have absorbed the β = kBT into the other parameters. Such
an approach is traditionally used in Statistical Physics, for example, let H
′
= βH, so
the new J in Hamiltonian of Ising model means βJ actually.), to describe the degree
of randomness in decision-making. Then we assume that the system should obey the
canonical ensemble distribution, that is the probability P (~x) of a microstate ~x is pro-
portional to its ‘Boltzmann factor’ determined by the total returns of the microstate
~x:
P (~x) =
e+βE(~x)∫
e+βE(~x)d~x
(1)
Then using the Metropolis simulation method[12, 13], we can get a Master equa-
tion to investigate the evolution of the system. With the continual change of system
parameters, we have found a so called ‘social phase transitions’ phenomenon related to
the emergence of labor division.
The model is defined in Section 2. The economies of specialization is introduced
by increasing returns from learning by doing. And the economies of complementarity
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is described by an additional payoffs from the combination of two products. Section 3
gives the numerical results. The effects of parameters on critical point are discussed in
detail. It is revealed that although the technical progress is a key factor that determine
whether or not the labor division will happen, the competitive cooperation among
agents has very important effects on the critical point. Our results are summarized in
Section 4.
2 The Model
Let’s consider a system consists of N homogeneous agents. In a given time period T ,
any agent has two different kind of tasks, namely A and B. In any time unit, the
fraction of working time on task A for ith agent is denoted by pi (t) ∈ [0, 1]. we are
interested in the long-term (T → ∞) evolution of the system, especially the emerging
of labor division.
pi is a real number in [0, 1], which describes the working pattern for the ith agent.
If pi equals 1 or 0, the agent is full specialized in A or B and we call the system is in
complete division of labor. If pi equals 0.5, it means that the agent spends same time
interval on tasks A and B, and we call it as the time-dividing working mode in the
following discussion. Usually pi could be any real number between 0 and 1, in this case
the agent does not have any preference on job A or B.We focus on the global behavior
of the system. Based on the above description of the agent, we introduce the following
two order parameters to describe the behavior of the system on macroscopic level:
λ1 (t) =
1
N
∑
i
∣∣∣2pi (t)− 1
∣∣∣ (2)
λ2 (t) =
1
N
∑
i
(
2pi (t)− 1
)
(3)
Where λ1 describes the intensity of labor division and cooperation in the system. It has
three special values, {0, 0.5, 1}, represent time-dividing working mode, every pi equals
0.5, no-preference working mode, pi distributed in (0,1) randomly, and full specializa-
tion, every pi equals 0 or 1, respectively. λ2 gives the agents allocation on tasks A and
B on global (in average on macroscopic level).
In the following discussion, we try to specify a suitable evolution rule for pi (t) based
on the similar approach in statistical physics. So we can then determine the dynamical
equations for pi (t), and get the final steady states for λ1 (t) and λ2 (t).
Analogous with Ising model in statistical physics, pi could be treated as the spin
in ith point of the lattice, and then λ2 is the magnetization. So if we can give the
Hamiltonian of the system, the evolution of the system could be determined. In the
economic system, the agent switches his behavior according to his evaluations on the
returns from production. Every agent try to get maximum return just as any practical
tends to stay in the state with lowest energy. So the payoff function from the agent’s
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production should have the same effect as the Hamiltonian. The working mode for each
agent should be determined by its returns.
2.1 Production function
According to the previous literatures on specialization and economic organization, we
know that there are several factors that related to the division of labor, such as the
increasing returns to specialization and transaction costs. In fact, limited ability on
learning and incomplete information on the technology will lead to the labor division
directly. But we don’t take them into account in this model. In our model, every
agent know the technology for producing A and B. And for any agent there is not any
comparative advantages for producing A or B in the initial. The technical progress is
achieved by the mechanism of learning by doing without any cost. The payoff function
for agent i is given by the following formulas:
εi = εitech + ε
i
self + ε
i
co (4)
where
εitech = p
i × ΓiA + α
(
1− pi
)
× ΓiB (5)
εiself = βmin
(
pi × ΓiA,
(
1− pi
)
× ΓiB
)
(6)
εico =
1
2
β
(
ΓiB
(
1− pi
)
− ΓiAp
i
)∑
j 6=i
(
ΓjAp
j − ΓjB
(
1− pj
))
(7)
In the functions above, ΓiA and Γ
i
B are the technology for producing A and B respec-
tively. For simplicity and without losing any generality, we assume that unit production
A will get unit return. And α ∈ (1,∞) is the return of unit production B. εiself gives
the additional benefits for composite A and B into a final product. So it is related to
the less one between A and B. If agent i has some more single product after the com-
position himself, he can also get another return, named εico, from the cooperation with
other agents. But the return got from the composition with the product from other
agent is factored by 12β. Because of the incomplete information in the system, any agent
couldn’t know the situation of production on global. So in order to get the correspond-
ing returns εico for every agent, we used the average-field approach similar with that in
statistical physics. That means, for every agent, he will match his product with all the
other agents and then the result is the average. This assumption indicate that there
are already a public market in economics. In the function for εico,
(
ΓiB
(
1− pi
)
− ΓiAp
i
)
gives the surplus product B for agent i, and the sum of
(
ΓjAp
j − ΓjB
(
1− pj
))
gives
the surplus product A of the all other agents. When these two terms have different
signs, their product is negative and εico, the corresponding payoff from the cooperation,
will be also negative. In this case, the surplus product of the agent is the same kind
as the final surplus of all the other agents. Because of the transaction cost and the
diseconomies of incomplementarity, it is rationale that the agent would get negative
payoff.
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2.2 Two descriptions for learning by doing
The way for technical progress is learning by doing. This mechanism is related to the
accumulation of agent’s historical production behavior. That means the development
of comparative advantages is determined by related working time. Let xiAorB denote
the integral working time on A or B for agent i:
xiA =
∫ t
0 dτp
i (τ)
xiB =
∫ t
0 dτ(1− p
i (τ))
(8)
We have introduced two mechanisms for technical progress, named γ-mechanism
and µ-mechanism. They are given by following functions:
ΓiA/B = γ
xi
A/B (9)
ΓiA/B = 1 +
µxiA/B
2
ν + xiA/B
2 (10)
These two mechanisms will give different results. Equation(9) is an exponential func-
tion which gives unlimited growth on technology, while there is an upper limit in equa-
tion(10). Figure(1) shows three functions for ΓiA/B in our computer simulations.
2.3 The Master equation for the system evolution
In the production function discussed above, term εico is the return from the agents’
cooperation. It introduces interactions among all agents (the same as the interactions
among spins). So if we discuss the dynamics in µ-space, we should construct N evo-
lutionary equations for pi. But they are difficult for both theoretical analysis and
computer simulation. In the following discussion, we try to describe the evolution of
the system in Γ-space. That is to discuss the evolutionary behavior of the joint density
function P
({
pi
}
, t
)
in the space sponsored by {pi}. Then the total production for the
system is:
E =
N∑
i=1
εi (11)
Where εi is the production of agent i given by eq(4). The same as the approach of
critical dynamics in Ising model, the Master equation for the joint density function
P
({
pi
}
, t
)
in Γ space is
d
dt
P
(
p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pN ; t
)
=
∑
i
∫ 1
0
dxi
[
ωi
(
xi → pi
)
P
(
p1, . . . , xi, . . . , pN ; t
)
−ωi
(
pi → xi
)
P
(
p1, . . . , pi, . . . , pN ; t
)]
(12)
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Figure 1: Sample functions of Γi used in the simulations. Parameters are labelled in
the graph.
where ωi is the transition probability which is determined by the Boltzman factors as
the following:
ωi
(
pi → xi
)
=
e∆E(p
i→xi)
∫ 1
0 dx
ie∆E(p
i→xi)
(13)
In the above transition probabilities, ∆E
(
pi → xi
)
is the change of returns related to
the variation of working mode for ith agent. From eq.(11) we can get
∆E
(
pi → xi
)
=
[(
ΓiA − αΓ
i
B +
1
2β
(
ΓiA − Γ
i
B
)) (
xi − pi
)
−β2
(∣∣xiΓiA −
(
1− xi
)
ΓiB
∣∣− ∣∣piΓiA −
(
1− pi
)
ΓiB
∣∣)
+2εico(x
i)− 2εico(p
i)
] (14)
With the master equation(12) and certain initial conditions, we can get evolving be-
haviors of λ1 and λ2. Then we can discuss the phenomena on labor division. It is
difficult to have some theoretical results. So in the next section we will show some
numerical simulation results by Monte Carlo simulation method. Based on the Master
equation(12) and corresponding transition probability(13), the simulation is proceed
on the following Metropolis algorithm:
1. For any given state with pi for agent i, a new state xi is randomly selected;
2. If ∆E
(
pi → xi
)
> 0, then the transition from pi to xi is proceeded;
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Figure 2: A typical evolutionary behavior of the model under µ-mechanism. β = 10.0,
α = 1.0.
3. If ∆E
(
pi → xi
)
≤ 0, then a random number ξ ∈ (0, 1) is selected. If ξ ≤ eβ∆E,
the transition from pi to xi is proceeded or else the agent i keeps the original
state.
4. For another agent j, goto step 1.
For any given initial state, the system will achieve a certain steady state after some
transient process. Figure(2) gives a typical evolution behavior under µ mechanism.
3 The Results of Monte Carlo Simulation
There are several parameters related to the mechanism of labor division in the model.
We will show the simple or maybe trivial results of γ-mechanism first and then em-
phasize our discussion on the results of µ-mechanism. And we let α = 1 in all the
simulations before we discuss the effects of parameters α and N on the system evolu-
tion in the end.
3.1 γ-mechanism
As shown in(3) because of γ-mechanism is described by an exponential function, the
system will achieve the state of labor division for any given initial state and γ > 1
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Figure 3: Parameter λ1 in the final stationary state as a function of parameter γ under
γ-mechanism. The final steady state of the system is determined by γ > 1 or γ < 1.
no matter how small is γ − 1. That means if the intensity of technical progress is big
enough, the agent would definitely specialized in a kind of task. Other factors such
as competitive cooperation described by parameter β have no effects on the long term
evolution.
3.2 µ-mechanism
But for the model with µ-mechanism, β has some important effects on the system
evolution. As shown in Figure(4), there are phase transitions results in labor division
and β has strong effects on the critical point µc for parameter µ. µc decreases as
the β increasing. The µ-mechanism for learning by doing gives a logistic growth for
technology. That is much more realistic than the γ-mechanism. The results reveal that
the competitive cooperation among agents is very important for the emergence of labor
division. However, as discussed in the end of this section, when µ = 0, that is there
is no mechanism of increasing returns, the system has no phase transition to labor
division. This result is rationale for the model and it is consistent with the theory on
specialization. The comparative advantages in production can only be introduced by a
positive feedback caused by increasing returns. So the mechanism of learning by doing
is a dominant factor for labor division.
In order to investigate the effects of all terms in production function in detail, we
have simulated some special cases. The first case is β = 0. Then εiself and ε
i
co in
equation (4) are all zero and technical progress is the only one factor that affects the
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Figure 4: For different parameter β, parameter λ1 in the final stationary state as a
function of parameter µ under µ-mechanism. There is phase transition in the system.
β has strongly effects on the critical point.
final results. As shown in figure(5), there is a phase transition in the system. Under
the given conditions, the critical point for µ (µc) is around 50.
Then we have simulated the model with εiself but no ε
i
co. The results are shown in
(6). When β is greater than a critical value βc, the system will stabilized in the state
with λ1 = 0. That is p
i = 0.5 for any agent i. Every agent does the tasks A and B
himself and spends the same time on both tasks. The system is in the time-dividing
working mode. Only when β is smaller than βc, does the system have phase transition
to labor division. But the critical value µc is much larger than that of in Figure (4).
It is even larger than the µc in Figure (5). So the term ε
i
self has the effect of anti-
specialization. From the simulation results in Figure (4) and just as we have indicated
in the beginning of this section, εico is helpful to labor division. Actually the term ε
i
co
is the benefit for agent i get from the cooperation with all the other agents. It should
has the same effect as the decreasing of transaction costs. So it is not surprising that
this term will enforce specialization.
Another interesting case is the system without technical progress, that is ΓiA and
ΓiB are all equal 1. In this case, the system is exactly the same as Ising model. Let
Si = 2pi − 1 and α = 1, then the total returns for the system is
E = −β
∑
i,j,i 6=j
SiSj +
1
2
∑
i
β
(
1−
∣∣∣Si
∣∣∣
)
(15)
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Figure 5: Under µ-mechanism and without the term εico that is the payoff from the
cooperation among agents, parameter λ1 in the final stationary state as a function of
parameter µ for different parameter β. The critical point µc is much larger than that
in Fig. 4 and even in Fig. 6.
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Figure 6: Under µ-mechanism, parameter λ1 in the final stationary state as a function
of parameter µ when there is only the term for technical progress in the production
function. The critical point µc is much larger than that in Fig. 4.
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Figure 7: Order parameters lambda1 and λ2 as a function of parameter β when there
is no progress of productivity. The system has no phase transition.
Where Si ∈ (−1, 1). The distribution of the state for the system is determined by eE .
Comprising with Ising model, let the corresponding Hamiltonian is
H = −
1
2
∑
i
β
(
1−
∣∣∣Si
∣∣∣
)
+ β
∑
i 6=j
SiSj (16)
and let kβT = 1, then the system could be described by Canonical Ensemble with
e
− H
kβT . That is an anti-ferromagnetic Ising model with global interaction. The similar
approach shows that this system either does’t have phase transition related to labor
division. The result is shown in Figure(7).
3.3 The effects of parameter α and N
Parameter λ2 reflects the preference for tasks A and B. So it is expected that parameter
α, the ratio of returns for A and B, will affect final results on λ2. The diagram in
phase space for λ2 when α = 1 is shown in Figure (8), in which we can see λ2 fluctuates
around zero, and no phase transition with symmetry breaking emerges. And as shown in
Figure(9), α indeed has some effects on λ2. But because of the combination mechanism
described by parameter β, α has only a little effect on λ2. It also has some detailed
effects on labor division described by λ1, as shown in Figure (10). But α could not
change the qualitative behavior of phase transition.
Here are other two phenomena that should be pay attention to, first, the model has
no scale effect for limited N , as shown in Figure (11). The phase curves for different N
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Figure 8: Parameter λ2 in the final stationary state as a function of parameter µ for
different β when α = 1. There is no symmetry breaking with the phase transition.
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Figure 9: Parameter λ2 in the final stationary state as a function of parameter α.
Because of the cooperation mechanism described by parameter β, α has only a little
effect on the final distribution.
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Figure 10: Parameter λ1 in the final stationary state as a function of parameter µ for
different α.
are almost consistent. It has only some effects on the accurate of simulation. Second,
When γ < 1.0 in γ-mechanism for technical progress, the productivity declines with
the time evolution. Then the system could not reach the state of specialization. This
result is also meaningful for real economic system.
4 Concluding Remarks
A distinctive feature of the organization of a human society is the division of labor.
From the classical economic theory[11], the division of labor comes from the devel-
opment of endogenous comparative advantages. So there is the intrinsic relationship
between technical progress and the evolution of the division of labor. But how and
why it emerges from the system consists of identical individuals? We have studied the
formation of labor division by the approach of statistical physics. The results reveal
that there is a phase transition with this pattern formation. Although the progress of
productivity dominated the phase transition occurs or not, the competitive cooperation
among the agents has important effects on the critical point. So the market formation
and labor division are usually reinforced each other. All the above results give us deep
understanding to the evolution of labor division.
Studying the economy as an evolving complex system, we can avoid the standard
economic assumptions of equilibrium based on rational behavior by agents. And the
concepts and methods developed in statistical physics is helpful to uncover fundamental
14
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Figure 11: When β = 0.5, α = 1.0, λ1 − µ curves for different population size N . The
curves are almost consistent.
principles governing the evolution of complex adaptive systems. So the approaches
presented here have potential applications in a variety of economical, biological and
financial problems.
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